WASHINGTON, Aug. 26 (UPI) -- I watched closely the summit between President Lee Jae Myung of the Republic of Korea and President Donald J. Trump here in Washington. On the surface, the summit went smoothly, measured words, positive atmospherics, handshakes and announcements of economic cooperation that both sides can sell to their domestic audiences.

Yet, as someone who spent a career focused on Korea, I cannot help but see that we avoided a crisis -- but failed to seize a historic opportunity.

On security, both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the ROK-U.S. alliance and the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. That foundation remained intact, despite Trump floating the idea of "U.S. ownership" of bases, a statement that raised eyebrows.

Experts correctly assessed that as a bargaining ploy more than a doctrinal shift, but it underscores the transactional way Trump still views overseas security responsibilities. Lee maintained composure and emphasized stability, ensuring that no immediate damage was done to the alliance fabric.

Regarding North Korea, the words were familiar: dialogue, deterrence and peacemaking. Trump, unsurprisingly, expressed his continued interest in another high-profile meeting with Kim Jong Un at the upcoming APEC summit. Lee encouraged this, clearly hoping for momentum in engagement.

However, the substance was lacking. North Korea's expanding nuclear arsenal was acknowledged, but no new strategy emerged to deal with it, and the familiar words used play into the hands of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and make the alliance vulnerable to his blackmail diplomacy.

On economic issues, the announcement of Korean Air's record-breaking purchase of 103 Boeing aircraft was heralded as a win-win, jobs in America industry and cooperation with Korea. Trade negotiations were touched on, with Trump boasting of progress, though looming issues like digital barriers and agricultural access remain unresolved. However, the big win-win for Koreans and Americans might be Lee's pledge to Make American Shipbuilding Great Again.

On politics, both men projected cordiality, even personal warmth. Lee played to Trump's ego, referencing The Art of the Deal, while Trump praised Lee's peace overtures. But atmospherics aside, both avoided difficult topics, such as Lee's domestic controversies or Trump's transactional "America First" instincts that sometimes undercut allied trust.

Finally, on strategic flexibility and U.S. basing, this was a careful dance. United States forward presence remains vital for deterrence across the Asia-Indo-Pacific, not just on the peninsula. Yet, by not addressing the broader integrated roles of U.S. forces in the region, Taiwan contingencies, multi-domain task force concepts and the pressing need for flexible deterrence, the summit missed an opportunity to modernize alliance strategy.

The bottom line: Cordiality won the day, but candor and strategic vision were left on the cutting-room floor.

Agreements, omissions and the missed strategic reset

There were, of course, welcome agreement areas. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, recognizing that forward-stationed troops, on the peninsula, not offshore, remain the keystone of deterrence. There were pledges for economic cooperation, acknowledgment of the importance of the alliance and gestures toward peace on the peninsula.

But what struck me, as both a practitioner and student of Korean security, was the glaring list of what was not discussed.

OPCON transition: silence. Alliance command structures will shape the future balance of deterrence, yet the leaders avoided it.

Strategic flexibility: silence. The American forward posture must be part of a broader Asia-Indo-Pacific scheme, integrating Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Australia. That vision was left out.

Denuclearization: barely mentioned. Trump repeated interest in "talking with Kim," but there was no roadmap, no pressure campaign, no mutually reinforcing strategy. Lee spoke of peace, but peace cannot be built on empty assurances from Pyongyang.

Thus, I judge this summit as moderately positive -- but a missed opportunity. Nothing collapsed. There was no rupture, no dangerous rhetoric that might destabilize deterrence.

But the leaders could have laid out a new strategic way ahead for the alliance, honing in on solving the "Korea question" itself, the unnatural division of the peninsula identified in Paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. That remains the unfinished business of the Korean War, and it was left out of this summit.

Unification, the Korea question, and the way forward

In his comments, Lee mentioned unification, echoing the dream of overcoming the peninsula's tragic division. This could have been seized upon; this was the moment to boldly chart a path forward toward solving the Korea question. Instead, the leaders clung to familiar, limited frames: arms control, deterrence and transactional deals.

Let me be blunt. If we are serious about real peace, the alliance must embrace a new "Two Plus Three Strategy":

• Deterrence: Maintain overwhelming readiness to counter any North Korean aggression.

• Strategic strangulation: Impose sustained, coordinated pressure on the Kim regime's illicit networks and finances.

• Human rights upfront: Stop treating human rights as secondary; put the suffering of 25 million Koreans at the center of policy.

• Holistic information and influence campaigns: Shape the cognitive domain, break Pyongyang's control of truth and empower Korean hearts and minds.

Pursuit of a free and unified Korea: Align U.S. and ROK policies toward unification, not just deterrence.

This strategy can be summed up in 12 words: "Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights."

I also must address what I think motivates Trump at a personal level. He has long coveted the Nobel Peace Prize. But I say unequivocally: no one will win a Nobel for merely shaking Kim Jong Un's hand, or even for achieving denuclearization alone.

Such a prize may come only when leaders help free 25 million enslaved North Korean people and enable the establishment of a free, unified Korea. That new nation, a democratic United Republic of Korea (U-ROK), would be the true achievement worthy of history and of Oslo's honor.

In sum: The August 2025 Lee-Trump summit did no harm. But it failed to do the one thing that mattered: to set the alliance on a bold trajectory toward resolving the division of Korea once and for all. The alliance deserves better. Korea deserves better. And the 25 million in the North are still waiting.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.